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From 1995 onward the financing scheme for specialist care in the Netherlands has moved from
a fee-for-service scheme to a lump-sum budget scheme. This paper analyses the economic and
welfare effects of this policy change. The paper adopts a model that integrates demand and
supply considerations and recognizes the potential roles of moral hazard and supplier-induced
demand. The model is fully numerical, being estimated and calibrated upon data for the Dutch
health care sector. The paper finds that the shift in financing regime has been welfare-reducing.
The policy change induced medical specialists to lower the supply of health services which was
already too low from a welfare point of view. This conclusion is robust to significant changes in
major parameter values.
Keywords: fee-for-service scheme, lump-sum budget, medical specialists, moral hazard
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1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the iHEA conference in York, July 22-25 2001. Thanks are due to
the participants and to Peter Kooiman, Esther Mot and an anonymous referee for useful remarks. Ton Brouwer
prepared the lay out of the graphs.
2 Our model is part of a larger one that covers almost the complete Dutch health care sector (Folmer et al. (1997),




For many years, the services delivered by medical specialists in the Netherlands have been
financed according to some sort of fee-for-service scheme. Although the financing scheme in
place was frequently adjusted, it basically remained fee-for-service as it linked the income of
medical specialists to the volume of their output. This financing scheme has been heavily
debated. In particular, it has been argued that it induces medical specialists to deliver more
services than is in the patients’ interests, increases aggregate expenditure on specialist care and
makes this expenditure uncontrollable at the macro level.
Six years ago, things have begun to change. In 1995, the Dutch government allowed
medical specialists to participate in so-called local initiatives, yearly negotiations between health
insurers, hospitals and the medical specialists affiliated with these hospitals, in which a budget
for medical specialists is negotiated that is independent of the volume of their services. The
specialists were free to participate in these local initiatives. However, if they chose not to
participate, they would run the risk that the government would continue to lower the fees for
their services as part of a policy of macro budgeting. Tired of political conflicts and faced with
the prospect of falling incomes, most medical specialists opted for participation in the new
financing scheme.
This paper investigates whether the move from a fee-for-service system to a lumpsum
budgeting system was good policies. We approach this question by using a model of specialist
care in which consumption decisions reflect both demand and supply factors.
2 In particular, we
adopt a principal-agent model in which medical specialists take consumption decisions and in
which demand enters these decisions as specialists derive utility from the fulfilment of patient
preferences. By including both demand and supply, we do justice to empirical evidence that
shows that medical consumption is responsive not only to demand factors like the out-of-pocket
price of medical consumption and patient income (e.g. Rosett and Huang (1973), Newhouse et
al. (1993)) but also to supply factors like physician income and the number of physicians relative
to the population (e.g. Evans (1974), Fuchs (1978), Newhouse (1987)).
Our model for medical specialists is empirically founded. Key parameters have been
taken from time series estimation on Dutch data; the remaining parameters have resulted from
calibrating the model upon 1995 values of relevant variables. We use this model to calculate the
medical consumption effects of the financial reform. Next, we use it to explore the implications
of this reform for patient welfare, physician welfare and social welfare. 
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Our model recognizes mainly two reasons why the reform of the payment scheme may have
changed social welfare. First, it will be seen to have reduced medical consumption. In general,
medical consumption may be too high or too low from a welfare point of view. The distortion of
the price of medical consumption that is inherent in insurance schemes makes medical
consumption too high; supplier-induced demand by medical specialists can make it too high or
too low. In our simulations, negative supplier-induced demand is the dominant factor. The
reduction of medical consumption that was due to the financial reform has thus reduced patient
welfare.
Second, the change in the payment system will be seen to have led to an increase of
leisure consumption by specialists, whereas their income has been left unchanged. However,
ethical costs - attached to not fully meeting with patient preferences - increased. On balance, the
reform has lowered the welfare of medical specialists. Social welfare, defined as the sum of
patient and physician welfare, has also declined.
The sensitivity analysis undertaken indicates that our findings are fairly robust: various
parameter configurations that differ considerably from our benchmark configuration yield
similar results. Furthermore, our calculations suggest that we could even have derived similar
results if we had taken the demand for medical services to be an exogenous variable. Thus,
general equilibrium effects appear to be of little relevance in our analysis.
Our paper fits into the literature on the welfare effects of medical insurance (e.g.
Feldman and Dowd (1991), Manning and Marquis (1996), Zeckhauser (1970)), but extends it by
recognising the independent role of physicians. This extension has an impact on both the
relation between fee and volume changes and the welfare consequences of the latter, as fee
changes generally also affect the well-being of physicians. Next, our paper joins the literature on
physician responses to fee changes (e.g. McGuire and Pauly (1991) and Rizzo and Blumenthal
(1994)), but extends it by including the role of patients. This allows us to demonstrate that
supplier-induced demand may help to combat the moral hazard that is due to insurance (see
also Wedig et al. (1989)). Close to our paper are Ellis and McGuire (1990, 1993) which also focus
on the interaction between demand and supply considerations. Different from these papers is
that our paper explores the effects of a real-world experiment and adopts specifications for the
demand and the supply of health care that have a strong empirical base. Furthermore, our paper
does not take demand and supply policies as independent, but as related, due to the constraint
that the financial reform that is analysed should not change the income of physicians.
Our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes some institutional features of
specialist care in the Netherlands. Section 3 sets up a framework for evaluating the effects of
different financing regimes. Next, section 4 constructs a model that fits into this framework and
section 5 gives information about its empirical foundation. Section 6 uses this model to calculate
the effects of various financing regimes. It also explores the robustness of these results. Finally,
section 7 concludes. 
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2 Medical specialists in the Netherlands: some important features
This section describes some important features of the Dutch insurance scheme and of the
position of the medical specialist in the health care system. These features are important as they
motivate many assumptions that underlie our model. Next, it discusses the reform that has been
implemented in the financing scheme for specialist care and that will be analysed in this paper.
Subsequently, it briefly reviews existing empirical evidence on the effects of the financial reform
upon the output of medical specialists.
In the Netherlands, two health insurance plans coexist. First there is a public insurance
scheme. The government selects who is eligible for public insurance. Roughly, those with a
labour income below about euro 27,500 are covered by the public insurance plan. This applies to
about two-thirds of the population. The rest of the population can voluntarily seek insurance on
the private market. In the Netherlands, only a negligible part of the population is not insured for
health care expenditure. Private insurance policies differ from their public counterpart in risk
differentiation in premiums and the use of deductibles. Our model recognizes this distinction
between the public and private schemes, and distinguishes the demand of those with public
insurance and those who are privately insured.
The Dutch health care sector is rather strongly regulated by the government, although
current policies aim to lower the degree of regulation. In particular, the supply of services is
controlled by requiring nearly all suppliers to have a permission to open a practice. Next, fees per
contact or treatment are bounded from above. Unlike many other West-European countries,
most specialists in the Netherlands are free entrepreneurs, although a growing number is
employee in a hospital (Van Lindert et al. (1999)). Hence, medical specialists in the Netherlands
are relatively autonomous, also in relation to hospital managers.  The latter have a limited
influence on the number of patients that should be treated and what kind of treatment should be
chosen.  Medical specialists are also relatively autonomous with respect to health care insurers.
The reason is that, in the Netherlands, insurers have up to this moment largely abstained from
managed care activities. Furthermore, specialists do not face budgets for their prescriptions of
pharmaceuticals outside hospitals. Hence, they are also relatively autonomous in their
prescription behaviour.
In order to increase the control of specialist expenditure, the Dutch government imposed
a budget on expenditure on specialist care at the macro level in 1992. If this budget was
exceeded, fees in the next year were reduced. This didn’t yield the desired results however,
mainly because there was no direct link at the level of the individual specialist between his
output and any subsequent fee reduction. In 1995, medical specialists, hospitals and health
insurers in a number of regions started to experiment with schemes with lumpsum budgets for
medical specialists. The government supported these experiments, first by offering other regions
in the Netherlands the possibility to participate in similar experiments, and, second, by stating 
3 This is not to say that individual physicians did not face important shifts in their incomes. Indeed, reduction of
income differentials across different specialties was one of the things that was negotiated in the local initiatives.
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that specialists that chose to participate would be freed from further fee reductions. As most
medical specialists chose to participate, the government in effect enlarged the experiment to the
whole field of medical specialists.
The fee-for-service system is still in place, though, but now only plays a role in the
financing of the budgets. The direct link between the number of treatments and the income of
the specialist has been removed. Moreover, income effects are largely absent, as budgets have
been determined such that aggregate specialist income did not change substantially.
3
An analysis of the consequences of the new financing scheme in the five hospitals
involved in the first round of experiments indicates that the financial reform has changed the
behaviour of specialists. The new system had effects upon various output variables like the
admission probability, the waiting time and the referral ratio (the number of referrals to the
general practitioner relative to the number of first visits) (Ziekenfondsraad (1998) and Van den
Berg and Mot (2000)). The probability of admission decreased because of the experiment. The
shift of financing scheme probably increased the average waiting time (Mot (2001)). In addition,
a statistically significant effect has been found for the referral ratio: after the introduction of the
new financing scheme, a significantly larger fraction of patients of medical specialists was
referred back to a general practitioner (Van den Berg and Mot (2000)). On the other hand, there
were no significant effects upon the average duration of stay. This could reflect that the duration
of stay is to a large extent driven by technological growth.
Aggregate time series of hospital admissions, outpatients treatments and outpatient visits
point in the same direction (Statistics Netherlands (2000)). Hospital admissions grew 1.1
percent a year during the period 1990-1994, but with the onset of the new financing regime the
average yearly rate of growth in the period 1995-1999 dropped to -1.7 percent. Outpatient
treatments grew firmly during 1990 -1994 at an average yearly rate of 10%, but the yearly
growth rate has declined since 1995 to 5,5%. The development of outpatient consultations yields
the same evidence. An average rate of increase during 1990-1994 of 1.3% was followed by an
average decline in later years: -0.11% during 1995-1999. Yet, the insured population grew in the
period from 1995 to 1999 at rates of 0.5 percent per year, whereas the share of people aged 65
and older increased from 13.2 to 13.5 in this period.
During 1997-1998, copayments were in place for the publicly insured. Although the
maximum of copayments was relatively small, this may have had a distinctive effect upon the
volume of specialist services demanded by the publicly insured. However, it cannot fully explain
the developments in the 1995-1999 period: exclusion of the 1997-1998 years gives a similar
picture for the 1995-1999 period. Apart from that, no other major policy reforms took place in
the period under consideration, which suggests that the developments in hospital production in 
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the 1995-1999 period can at least partly be attributed to the change in the financing scheme for
medical specialists.
Summing up, micro evidence on specialist behaviour in the hospitals that were the first
to experiment with the new financing scheme points to a negative effect on the volume of
specialist services. Macroeconomic time series on various output variables in the 1995-1999
period hint in the same direction. Further, it is useful to remark that currently a new financing
scheme, in particular a scheme based upon diagnosis-related-groups, is under discussion in the
Netherlands, mainly because it is felt that the current lumpsum budgeting system offers too
little incentives for specialist production. 
12 
4 Actually, it would be better to speak of notional demand. For it is difficult to define demand given that the
consumers of medical care are by assumption imperfectly informed and go to the doctor precisely to get informed.
Indeed, demand should be interpreted as the amount of services that consumers would have preferred had they
been perfectly informed. For brevity however, we will use the term demand throughout the paper.
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3 A framework for comparing different financing regimes
To be able to compare different financing regimes, we use a model that consists of three blocks.
The first two blocks describe the behaviour of patients and medical specialists respectively. The
third block evaluates the results for different regimes on the basis of individual welfare
functions.
Several elements warrant separate discussion here. The moral hazard effect of insurance
schemes is well-documented in health economics. Our analysis takes this into account by setting
up a general framework that encompasses a great variety of coinsurance schemes. A second
important element is the characterisation of health care markets. We think it is appropriate to
view markets for medical services as disequilibrium markets. Information asymmetry and lack
of transparency and homogeneity of the services traded suggest that price adjustment as a
balancing mechanism is at best only partly successful. The implication of this observation is that
supply and demand may be different, both at the individual and at the aggregate level. A third
caveat is that we have found demand effects to play a minor role in our analysis. Indeed, our
calculations suggest that similar results would have been obtained had we taken demand to be
exogenous. Still, we present the model with endogenous demand for we cannot claim a priori
that demand effects will be irrelevant.
Having concluded that supply and demand may be different, the question arises which 
factor(s) determine actual consumption. The strong information asymmetry and the
autonomous position of the medical specialist in the Dutch health care sector suggest that the
role of medical specialists in determining actual consumption levels is large. For part of the
medical markets, we take this to its extreme and postulate that physicians alone determine
consumption levels. However, we do recognize the role of demand by letting demand be one of
the factors that govern the behaviour of physicians.
4 Indeed, the aggregate supply model we will
use is a mix of a principal-agent model in which the medical specialist acts as an agent of the
patient and a neoclassical labour supply model which describes the specialist’s choice between
consumption and leisure.
The model for patient behaviour derives the demand for specialist services from a utility
function which includes the consumption of specialist services and other products as
arguments. Using the patient budget constraint, utility can be expressed as a function of the
patient’s income (net of health care premiums),  , and the relative price of medical services,  .
The patient population is heterogeneous with respect to the need of health care, measured by , , 
5 The absence of the i index with the income variable denotes that our model abstracts from the heterogeneity of
patient income. Given that the income elasticity of the demand for medical care is relatively small, this abstraction is
not particularly relevant in the context of our analysis.
6 The distinction in our model between first consultations and subsequent specialist services aims to separate the
health care decision in a decision to seek care and a decision on the amount of treatment. Note that our assumption
that it is the consumer who decides whether or not to seek care and that it is the specialist who decides on the
intensity of treatment conforms to the findings reported in Newhouse (1996) that demand-side cost sharing mainly
affects decisions to seek care, whereas supply-side cost sharing mainly operates on the treatment intensity.
7 As described in section 2, until 1997 different fees for specialist services applied to publicly and privately insured
patients. In this paper we have assumed that fees have been harmonised since 1995 to be able to study the impact of
the specialist budget separately from that of the fee harmonisation. For a discussion of the effects of fee
differentiation, see Canton et al. (1999). 
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and the insurance status, denoted by index j. As the allocation over the public and private
insurance scheme is on the basis of income, we also distinguish an average income related to
the insurance status. Hence, the utility function can be written as   where i ' * ,
indexes patients and z denotes medical demand.
5 Maximisation of utility with respect to the
consumption of health care yields a demand function which expresses demand as a function of
income and the price of medical services:  . Aggregation yields the ' ,
corresponding aggregate demand for medical services:   where   denotes '
m
,
the number of households in insurance scheme j and   is the distribution function of  , ,
for the insured of type  . Equating the demand for first consultations to the number of diseases
for which patients seek treatment,  demand for all medical services can be decomposed into the
demand for first consults,  , and demand for specialist services,  . Finally, '0 ' &0
aggregation over the two insurance schemes yields aggregate demand for first consultations and
treatments:   and . '' ''
The second block describes the behaviour of medical specialists. Medical specialists are
assumed to decide only on the supply of specialist services during subsequent consultations of
patients, taking as given the number of first consultations (Rutten (1978)).
6 Maximisation of a
utility function   under appropriate constraints yields the supply function for *
subsequent medical services,  :  , where k indexes physicians. It is a function '
of demand,  , the number of first consultations,  , the fee for medical services 
7,  ,  and the
ethical cost variable  . As long as the specialist acts as a perfect agent of the patient, ethical costs
are zero. Costs are positive as soon as she acts in her own interest. The subscript k on e reflects
that physicians differ in their ethical costs. Aggregation over all specialists yields aggregate
supply   where   denotes the number of physicians and   is the '
m
distribution function of  .
Obviously, there is no mechanism in our model that ensures that demand and supply
will coincide. Indeed,   and   will generally deviate. To derive the supply of services for 
8 The expression for   reflects that we assume   or the ratio between the demand for first consultations and the 0
demand for subsequent treatments to be the same for households who have different  . This assumption is made ,
for simplicity, but may be unrealistic. However, it will not greatly affect our conclusions.
15
individual patients, we adopt the idea of proportional rationing, i.e. at the level of the individual
patient the ratio of supply and demand equals  .
First consultations are beyond the control of the specialist. Hence, the consumption of
first consultations   is demand-determined:  . However, the consumption of '
subsequent services   is determined by the supply decision of the medical specialist:  . '
Total medical consumption can then be calculated as  . Similarly, total ' % ' %
medical consumption for patient i of type j reads as 
8 . ' % '0 % &0
Next to patients and physicians, two other actors exist in the model. First, two different
types of insurance companies collect premiums from the insured which they use to cover
medical expenditure net of copayments. By assumption, the two industries make zero profits.
Second, the government redistributes income across medical specialists. In particular, patients
and insurers pay  , but medical specialists collect   per unit of medical services. The
difference,  , is distributed by the government to specialists on a lumpsum basis, i.e. &
independent of their medical production. Hence, if   is negative, the government actually &
levies a lumpsum tax on specialists. We choose the lumpsum budget of specialists such as to
neutralise the income effects of changes in the services fee. This device bears resemblance with
the financial reform that is analysed (see section 2). Besides, income neutrality implies that
policy changes do not affect the distribution of income over patients and physicians, which
allows us to exclude income considerations from our welfare analysis.
 The evaluation of patient welfare comes down to recalculating utility, with demand 
replaced with actual consumption  . Aggregate patient welfare can in turn be calculated as
. The evaluation of physician welfare comes down to calculating the value ''
m
,
of utility   for the optimal amount of services  . Aggregate physician welfare then reads as
. In order to calculate social welfare, we first calculate the changes in patient '
m
welfare and physician welfare which are due to the policy change. Next, we convert these
changes into their consumption equivalents, i.e. the welfare changes in terms of units of the
non-medical consumption good, in order to bring the two welfare changes on the same footing.
The change in social welfare is then simply the sum of all consumption equivalents.
All variables can be expressed as a function of the fee for medical services   which serves
as a policy instrument. Hence, we can calculate the level of welfare that corresponds to the
current regime in the Netherlands and compare it with the welfare level of the pre-reform fee-
for-service regime. This allows us to evaluate the welfare effects of the financial reform. In
addition, we can derive the financing scheme that is optimal in the sense of maximising patient
welfare, physician welfare or social welfare. 
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Having laid down our general framework, we now make concrete the three building
blocks that together make up our model. This involves first the specification of utility functions
and constraints for patients and medical specialists. Next, we have to specify the heterogeneity of
the patient and physician population. Thirdly, we have to fill in numbers for the various
parameters that enter into the models of patient and specialist behaviour. For all these purposes,
we rely upon a model for the Dutch health care sector, which was constructed primarily to assess
the numerical effects of various policy reforms. 
9 Our model does not take into account the heterogeneity of incomes within the groups of the publicly insured and
the privately insured. Similarly, it does not include the heterogeneity of copayment schemes among the privately
insured. These simplifications are not relevant in the context of our analysis.
10 See Westerhout and Folmer (1997) for a more detailed discussion of the patient models.
11 As the value of the parameter ( is independent of the insurance status of the patient (see section 5), we use 1/maxj
yj rather than 1/y as the relevant boundary.
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4 A model of specialist care
4.1 Patient behaviour
The patient population consists of two groups, those who are publicly insured and those who are
privately insured. The two groups have different average income levels
9, face different
copayment schemes and generally differ in their need of health care. Their economic behaviour
may be very similar though. Hence, we adopt one model of patient behaviour which we
implement separately for the two groups of insured. This section discusses this model.
10 For
ease of notation, we omit the insurance index.
The patient derives utility from the consumption of medical specialist services, z, and the
consumption of other goods and services, c. Medical specialist services are sometimes referred
to as ‘consultations’ or ‘visits’, while in fact they refer to treatments. Patients are assumed to
have linear-quadratic additively separable preferences over the two types of goods,
where ui is patient i’s utility and y is the income of the patient net of health care premiums.
Our motivation to employ a linear-quadratic specification is twofold. First, we want to
allow the marginal utility of medical care to turn negative if medical consumption becomes
sufficiently high (i.e. the possibility of iatrogenesis, see Lee (1995)). Second, zero marginal utility
of medical care is needed to obtain a finite solution for the demand for health services when the
out-of-pocket price is set at zero. Note however that negative marginal utility of non-medical
consumption is excluded by imposing  <1/y.
11 We allow medical need to be unevenly (
distributed among individuals. This heterogeneity is reflected in the model by assuming   to ,
differ across individuals.
The patient faces a kinked budget constraint. He pays the cost of medical services up to
some copayment maximum m; above this maximum, the out-of-pocket price of medical services
equals zero. This modelling device covers the copayment systems that feature the two insurance 
12 More generally, the out-of-pocket price equals btc, where b represents the copayment rate (0# b# 1). As in the
Netherlands for services of medical specialists only the case in which b equals one is relevant , we set b at this value.
13 In principle, the solution to the demand for medical services can be defined for two different cases. In the polar
case  , the copayment maximum is so low that anybody who consumes a positive amount of medical services ,
(( ,
(
pays the maximum amount of copayments. In case  , a positive fraction of the patient population faces ,
(( ,
(
copayments below the maximum. As the former case lacks any empirical relevance, this section elaborates only the
latter case. Also in our numerical simulations, the former case does not occur.
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schemes in the Netherlands. Indeed, private insurance schemes in the Netherlands feature
deductibles, whereas in the public insurance scheme copayments are fully absent.
Defining the non-medical product as numeraire, the price of the medical product by 
12,
we can formalise the patient’s budget constraint as
Equation (2) states that consumption of medical services restricts the consumption of other
goods and services as long as copayments are below the maximum m.
The demand for medical services follows from the maximisation of utility function (1) 
subject to budget constraint (2) . The nonsatiation assumption   implies that the budget (
constraint is always binding. The description for the demand for medical services depends on
whether the copayment maximum   is higher or lower than a critical value   (defined in
(
Appendix A).  In the former case, the expression for the demand for medical services  depends




13 The demand for medical services is described by the following system: ,
( ,
((
In case  , the demand for medical services depends upon one critical value for  ,
( ,
denoted by  (which is also defined in Appendix A). The demand for medical services is then  ,
((( 
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described by the following system:
At the population level, we can express the demand for medical services for each type of insured
as a weighted sum of the relevant components. As explained in section 2, the model
distinguishes the patient population with respect to type of insurance: public and private
insurance. If we use the fact that copayments are absent in the public insurance scheme and that
the copayment maximum in private schemes is rather high, we can derive that aggregate
demand of the privately insured obeys equations (3) to (5); aggregate demand of the publicly
insured is described with equation (7) (  if  ). If we use subscripts p and n to refer ,
(((' '
to publicly and privately (non-publicly) insured patients respectively, aggregate demand for
services by the two groups can be formulated as follows:
where G(.) stands for the cumulative distribution function of  , +(x*y) is the expectation of x ,
conditional upon y and   is the size of the corresponding population of insured.
Expressions (6) and (7) demonstrate that the demand by the publicly insured is
unresponsive to the price for medical services. Expressions (3) to (5) illustrate how the demand
for specialist services by the privately insured reacts upon a change in the price of medical
services. Obviously, a price increase does not affect the demand of those who do not consume
any medical services (equation (3)). It neither affects the demand of those who face a zero out-of-
pocket price as their medical expenditure already exceeds the amount of the deductible (equation
(5)). On the other hand, an increase in the price of medical services unambiguously reduces
consumption of those who have not emptied their deductible (equation (4)). In sum, the direct
effect of a price increase is to lower demand. 
14 See also Folmer et al. (1997) for a discussion of the physician model.
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However, apart from this direct effect, compositional effects play also a role. Indeed, price
changes generally influence the size of the three groups of consumers. It can be derived from
equations (A1) - (A5) in Appendix A that ,
* and ,
** are decreasing and increasing functions of the
service fee   respectively. In particular the former is relevant since demand   is discontinuous
at  . As a price increase implies that consumers will exhaust their deductible with a lower , ' ,
(
level of medical consumption, the range of consumption over which the out-of-pocket price is
zero is increased. This boosts the demand for medical consumption. It is unlikely though that
the compositional effects will dominate the direct effect. Indeed, in none of the numerical
versions we experimented with, was this the case. Therefore, we will not discuss further the
compositional effects.
Assuming that each disease takes one first consultation, we can split demand into the
demand for first consultations and subsequent services as follows:
where 0p and 0n equal the share of the demand for first consultations in total demand of publicly
and non-publicly insured patients, respectively. The expressions for aggregate demand at the
population level then speak for themselves:
4.2 The behaviour of medical specialists
The basic theoretical structure from which the behaviour of medical specialists is derived is the
neoclassical labour supply model.
14 To account for some specific features of specialist behaviour,
this basic structure is extended along two dimensions. First, in formulating the time and budget
constraint, the specialist takes as given the amount of first visits. Patients decide on first
consultations so that these are beyond the physician’s control.
Second, an agency relationship between the patient and the specialist is imposed. In principle,
the presence of imperfect information at the side of the patient makes it possible for the medical
professional to deviate from the patient’s interest and pursue other (personal) objectives. On the 
15 The fixed nature of ethical costs may be unrealistic. In particular, ethical costs may be increasing in the deviation
between demand and supply. As this would seriously complicate the derivation of a tractable empirical specification,
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other hand, we do not think it reasonable to assume that the physician can fully neglect the
patients’ interests. Reputation considerations, the medical oath, or medical ethics all lead us to
regard physicians as agents of patients. This special agency-feature is allowed for in the model
by imposing a (fixed) ethical cost on the professional when she deviates from the patient’s best
interest (in other words: when the action selected by the professional deviates from the action
that the patient would have selected under perfect information).
A medical professional k derives utility, vk, from leisure, lk, and the consumption of other
goods and services, dk. The utility function is specified in CES-format,
where e refers to the ethical cost which is imposed on the physician when she fails to deliver
demand. The assumption that ethical costs of not acting in the patient’s best interest are fixed is
made in order to simplify the analysis.
15 An implication of this assumption is that physicians
have to choose between two options, viz. an ‘ethical’ and a ‘financial’ option.
The physician maximises her utility subject to a time constraint and a budget constraint.
The time constraint says that leisure time is determined from the difference between the total
time allotment T and the time allocated to consultations. Recognising that the number of first
visits per specialist reads as   (where   denotes the number of specialists) and denoting
the number of subsequent consultations by s, we have,
where µ
f units of time are needed for a first consultation and µ
s units of time for every
subsequent visit. We assume that it always holds true that  . &
Consumption equals the professional’s income, which is calculated as the revenue from
subsequent consultations and an additional income component beyond the control of the
physician. Or,
where t stands for the fee per service supplied and a is income beyond the physician’s control.
This type of income comprises two items, 
16 If fees were different, the specialist that prefers the financial option would supply subsequent consultations only to
the group of insured to which the highest fee value applies (see Folmer et al. (1997)).
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h is the physician’s lumpsum income (net of the fixed costs of running a doctor’s practice). The
second term in equation (17) determines the physician’s income from first consultations.
In order to derive the physician’s behaviour, it will be useful to first obtain the solution
that maximises the physician’s utility from consumption and leisure (i.e. the first term at the
RHS of (14)). This solution characterises the financial option. The interior solution of the
maximisation problem, denoted  , reads as
(
where the auxiliary variable $ is defined as:
and F=1/(1+D) is defined as the (constant) elasticity of substitution between consumption and
leisure. Equation (19) shows that 0<$<1.
Obviously, labour supply cannot be negative. Hence, labour supply under the financial
option is described by the interior solution to the corresponding maximisation problem,  ,
(
except when  , in which case 0 replaces the interior solution. Formally,  . The
( '
(
solutions for non-medical consumption and leisure that correspond to the financial option read
as   and   respectively, and follow from substituting this value of   into expressions (16) and
(15).
Note that as the service fee does not distinguish between the publicly and the privately
insured, the physician is indifferent between supplying medical services to the publicly or the
non-publicly insured
16. For the same reason, she is indifferent to supplying services to
consumers that differ in their medical need  . In order to obtain a unique solution for the ,
supply at the level of the individual patient, we assume that the specialist who prefers the
financial option divides her services between all her patients so that each patient faces the same
















We stress that expression (18) implies that financial physicians may supply more or less
medical services than demanded, depending on the physician’s particular preferences for
consumption and leisure and her incentives to supply medical services. In particular, the
physician may supply more than demand to raise her income and supply less than demand to
gain leisure time.
Under the ethical option, a specialist accommodates her supply of subsequent
consultations,  , to the corresponding demand,  . The only exception occurs when this
behaviour would imply negative leisure. In that case,   replaces  . This effect &
does not occur in any of our simulations, however. Apart from this exceptional case, both the
publicly insured and the privately insured receive the amount of medical services they would
have demanded in the absence of any information imperfections. We use   and   to denote the
consumption of non-medical goods and leisure under the ethical option. These two variables are
derived by substituting the solution for   into expressions (16) and (15) respectively.
Now we can calculate the critical level of ethical costs, denoted as  , for which the
(
physician is indifferent between the financial and the ethical option by solving the equality:
where   and   are implicitly defined by the first and last term of the second line of equation
(20) respectively.
Using this expression for e
*, the outcome of the optimisation problem can now be
summarised as follows:
A physician thus prefers the financial option if e
* exceeds her ethical cost variable e. The ethical
option is chosen whenever e
* is below this threshold value. By definition, the physician is
indifferent between the two options when  . '
(
We now assume that physicians are heterogenous with respect to the value of the ethical
cost variable e. Hence, a number of physicians will prefer the ethical option while others will
choose the financial option. Denoting the distribution function of e by Gs(e), the supply of 
17 The income effect relates not only to the supply of subsequent treatments, but also to the supply of first
treatments.
18 Obviously, one may remark that because the lumpsum income component is adjusted in order to compensate for
the income effects of fee changes, the income effect is nil. However, this is not entirely correct. The point is that
ethical and financial specialists differ in their supply and thus in the income effects due to fee changes whereas the
lumpsum income adjustment is the same for the two groups of specialists. As income is relevant only for the supply






medical services at the aggregate level can then be expressed as a weighted average of supply as
defined for the two options:
What are the effects of an increase in the service fee? We distinguish a direct effect plus two
groups of indirect effects. The direct effect of a fee increase is to change the supply by financial
specialists. Here, two factors work in opposite direction. A higher fee makes it financially more
attractive to provide medical services (a substitution effect), but also increases the physician’s
income and thereby her demand for leisure (an income effect).
17 In the numerical version of our
model, the elasticity of substitution is sufficiently high for the substitution effect to dominate, so
the effect of a fee increase is to increase supply.
18 However, this works only for intermediate fee
levels. Too low fee values restrict the supply by financial specialists to be zero. Combined, we
should expect the supply of services by financial specialists to be a function of the services fee
that consists of two parts: a flat part for low fee levels and a decreasingly upward-sloping part for
high fee levels.
Note that the supply by ethical specialists is not directly affected by an increase in the
services fee. The total supply function should therefore have properties identical to the function
that describes the supply by financial specialists. However, two groups of indirect effects disturb
the picture.
First, as will be shown below, the consumer price may decrease when the producer price
increases on account of a general-equilibrium effect. This decrease may boost the demand for
first consultations and subsequent consultations which basically has two effects. On the one
hand, the ethical specialist responds to the increase in demand for subsequent consultations by
raising her supply of medical services. On the other hand, the financial specialist responds to the
increase in first consultations by reducing her supply of subsequent consultations. Indeed, the
increase in first consultations leaves her less time to supply subsequent services and increases
her income collected from first consultations. As the effect of an increase in demand is to
increase the supply by ethical specialists, but to decrease the supply by financial specialists, the
effect upon total supply remains ambiguous. 
19 Note that we make this assumption only for the purpose of explanation. In our model, the consumption-leisure
pair corresponding to the ethical option does change, but less than the pair that corresponds to the financial option.
Hence, qualitatively the argument developed above holds true.
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Second, compositional effects play a role too. Indeed, the fraction of specialists that
choose to be ethical or financial is endogenous and may thus respond to a change in the services
fee. Intuitively, it is clear that the fraction of financial specialists is a positive function of the
service fee in deviation from the fee level for which supply and demand are equal. At the latter
fee level, 100% of the specialists choose for the ethical option as the two options coincide with
respect to levels of consumption and leisure, but only the financial option includes ethical costs.
If the fee deviates from this specific fee level, the financial option generally corresponds to a
different pair of consumption and leisure. Assuming that the consumption-leisure pair that
corresponds to the ethical option does not change,
19 the change in the fee drives a wedge
between the consumption-leisure pairs that correspond to the ethical and financial option. As
the latter implies the highest utility, it follows that the change in fee must increase the utility
differential between the financial and ethical option. This will lead a number of specialists,
namely those with the lowest ethical costs, to decide to switch to the financial option.
Consequently, the number of financial specialists increases. As the argument relates to the
deviation of the service fee from the level for which demand and supply are equal, it follows that
the fraction of financial specialists is a U-shaped function of the fee, with a minimum of zero at
the fee level for which demand and supply coincide. The role of this compositional effect is
generally ambiguous. Whether the change in the fraction of financial specialists that
corresponds to the increase in service fee, strengthens or weakens the relation between supply
and service fee, depends on whether the financial option or ethical option features the highest
supply.
Summing up, we have a direct effect and two indirect effects, of which only the former is
unambiguous. As we will see, the supply effects of fee changes in the numerical version of our
model correspond to a large extent with this direct effect.
4.3 Closure of the model
We close the model by specifying the calculation of copayments and premiums, of the consumer
price of medical services and of lumpsum subsidies to specialists.
For the calculation of copayments, note that patients whose expenditure is lower than the
copayment maximum   pay their health care expenditure  , where   refers to realised
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Here,   refers to demand for first treatments and   equals supply of subsequent treatments.
Copayments by patients with medical expenditure higher than   equal  . Denoting the




copayments, denoted  , read as follows (see equation (9)):





actual consumption rather than demand. Premiums,  ,  follow easily from subtracting
copayments from total expenditure,  , where   reads as  : %
The consumer price of medical services,  , consists of the fee-for-service,  , plus a tax levied by
the government at rate  : J
The revenues from this tax,  , are used to finance lumpsum subsidies to specialists,  : J
Hence, the specialist receives her income from two sources. The first is the payment for the
services she delivers at the fee-for-service rate  . The second is the lumpsum subsidy that is
granted by the government (see also equations (16) and (17)).
The policy change that this paper analyses keeps specialists on their initial income level.
This is achieved by adjusting lumpsum subsidies. This implies that   is calculated as follows.
Combine expressions (16) and (17) to yield the following expression for income per specialist: 
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Next, by aggregation over all specialists we obtain
where   and   is defined in equation (22). This equation can be written as an '
m
expression for  :
This expression tells us which value of   keeps   constant when the government changes the
fee level  .
The neutrality of specialist income with respect to the fee for medical services implies
that health care expenditure is a constant. The same holds true for the sum of health care
premiums and copayments, as this equals health care expenditure. The same holds also true for
non-medical consumption c of patients, which equals patient income net of the sum of health
care premiums and copayments. The welfare analysis will make use of this property.
4.4 Welfare
For both the publicly insured and the privately insured, we define patient welfare   as the sum
of individual utilities, where the summation runs over consumers who differ in their value for
: ,
Appendix B provides further details on the elaboration of the expression for patient welfare
when health care consumption is lognormally distributed.
Similarly, welfare of medical specialists,  , is defined as the sum of the welfare of
specialists choosing for the ethical and the financial option: 
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where   and   are implicitly defined by the first and second term on the second line of
equation (32).
In formula (32),   equals the share of specialists that opt for the financial option.
(
Ethical costs are only relevant for those specialists who choose to bear these costs, i.e. the
specialists whose   is below  .
(
We also want to calculate the effect of the financial reform upon social welfare. Note that
simply adding up patient welfare (equation (30)) and specialist welfare (equation (31)) makes no
sense due to the ordinal nature of the two welfare functions. Therefore, we first transform the
changes in patient and physician welfare into their consumption-equivalent counterparts. The
latter are defined in terms of the non-medical consumption good which is consumed by both
patients and specialists. The two consumption-equivalent changes can be added up to arrive at
the consumption-equivalent change in social welfare. Appendix C gives a detailed specification
of the method of consumption-equivalent welfare changes.
Our welfare measure is quite standard in the literature, although one may find the
neglect of redistributional concerns a drawback. However, note that our analysis focuses more
on efficiency effects than on distribution effects (witness also the assumption of proportional
rationing made in section 4). Therefore, it would be difficult to motivate a welfare measure that
includes redistributional aspects. 
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5 Empirical foundation of the model
The empirical foundation of the model is based on time series estimation as well as on
calibration. The demand for subsequent treatments cannot be observed, as - according to our
model - data on subsequent treatments reflect both supply and demand elements. Therefore we
have proceeded in reverse order. We first estimated the supply model. This estimation yields an
estimate of demand. This estimate of demand was then used as an input in the calibration of
our patient models.
Medical specialists
We have estimated a linearize reduced-form expression for the growth in the supply of specialist
services (equation (21)) using time series analysis. Subsequently, we have transformed these
estimates into values of the structural parameters of the specialist model. This procedure
implies that the parameter values  of the model depend on estimated coefficients and exogenous
variables as well. That is to say, it is possible to obtain a complete set of structural coefficients for
each year in the sample. For details on the estimation and calibration procedure we refer to
Folmer (1998).
To promote stability of the share of specialists that prefer the financial option, we have
imposed that at least 70% of the specialists always prefers the ethical option. This guess has
been based on the computed values of Gs(e
*) in all sample years. For the remainder, the
distribution of ethical costs e across specialists is chosen to be lognormal. Apart from being fully
identified by two parameters, the lognormal form for   ensures that the argument e is
always positive. This choice implies that ln e is normally distributed. Its mean and standard
deviation are denoted as µe and Fe. The values of these parameters can be obtained from
estimated coefficients, as the empirical equation for the supply of services is specified in growth
rates.
Table 5.1  Parameter values in the specialist model (average 1991/1995)
parameter description value
F elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure, financial specialist 6.91
" relative weight of consumption in utility specialist 0.0016
µs mean of ln e 7.35
Fe standard deviation of ln e 1.35
minimum fraction of specialists that prefers to be ethic 0.7
variable description
Gs (e
*) relative preference for the financial option 0.13
$ definition: see equation (19) 0.1
e
* value of ethical cost at which the physician is indifferent between both options 1272 
20 Supplier-induced demand cannot play a role as we assume specialists to ration different consumers
proportionally (see above).
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Table 5.1 summarises the results of our calibration procedure. The elasticity of substitution
between consumption and leisure time looks rather high, namely 6.91. However, this value
applies to financial specialists only. As a measure of the substitution possibilities between
leisure and consumption, the average of the substitution elasticities corresponding to financial
and ethical specialists, Gs(e
*) F, may be better. This average elasticity of substitution equals 0.91
in the calibration year, which is in line with estimates in the literature (Rizzo and Blumenthal
(1994)). Supply is 10.8% below demand in the calibration year, reflecting a substantial degree of
negative supplier-induced demand.
Patients
Canton et al. (1999) describe in detail the empirical implementation of the model for both the
privately and the publicly insured. Here we will globally discuss this issue.
The procedure consists of four steps. First, recall that the parameter   is stochastic. We ,
characterise its distribution as lognormal. The motivation for doing so is that there is evidence
that health care expenditure is lognormally distributed (see Van Vliet and Van der Burg (1996)
for the Netherlands and Duan et al. (1982) for the United States) and, according to our model,
the parameter   is highly correlated with expenditure. As to the latter, the parameter   is , ,
proportional to the demand for health care at a zero out-of-pocket price. This means that the
correlation between   and expenditure can only be lower than one due to copayments.
20 Given ,
lognormality, the distribution of ln( ) is normal with parameters, say, µ, and  . Van Vliet and ,F ,
Van der Burg (1996) have computed the coefficient of variation of the distribution of health care
expenditure  based on cross section data for 1991 - 1994, from which it is easy to derive an
average estimate of  . F,
This leaves us with three parameters that remain to be identified:  , µ, and  . These *(
three parameters are calibrated simultaneously by using information on the aggregate income
elasticity of the demand for medical services, the level of average demand and the insurance
effect. The latter is defined as the ratio of the demand of a fully insured (with a zero copayment
maximum) and an uninsured patient and in turn derives from an estimate of the price elasticity
of health care demand (Van Vliet (1998)). This insurance effect equals 1.2, which is in line with
estimates in the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (Newhouse et al. (1993)). As explained
above, the level of average demand is derived from the calibration of the specialist model, which
characterises demand as one of the determinants of supply.
For the publicly insured, no information is available on price and income elasticities as
the public insurance scheme lacks copayments. We assume therefore that the corresponding 
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structural parameters of the model of the privately insured apply to the model of the publicly
insured as well. Consequently, the values of (p  and *p equal those of (n  and *n respectively.
Table 5.2 summarises the calibration of the two patient models. The price elasticity of
demand is generated by the model itself for each year as it depends on all estimated coefficients,
the income y and the copayment maximum m. Its computed value is quite large. The average
price elasticity of demand, which multiplies this price elasticity with the fraction of the patient
population that faces a positive out-of-pocket price, equals -0.40.
The model generates an average yearly increase in the number of treatments of medical
specialists of about 2.2% over the period 1996 - 2000. Is this in line with the observed growth
rate? To see this one needs to convert observed growth rates for admissions, outpatient
treatments and outpatient visits into the rate of specialist treatments. The transformation
requires data about developments in the number of treatments per admission, outpatient
treatment and outpatient visit. Table 5.3 summarises. It follows that the average realised growth
rate (2.4%) in specialist treatments is close to the rate generated by the model.
Table 5.2 Calibration of the patient models (1995)
Data: privately insured patients publicly insured  patients
Copayment maximum (m)e u r o  5 7 0
Demand volume per capita 0.175 0.276











computed price elasticity -0.69 
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Table 5.3 Model outcomes and observed trends, 1996 - 2000
average yearly growth rate 1996 - 2000
(i) admissions -1.7
treatments per admission 1.5
treatments during admissions -0.2
(ii) outpatient visits -0.1
treatments per outpatient visit 2.4
treatments during outpatient visits 2.3
(iii) outpatient treatments 5.6
treatments per outpatient treatment 1.6
treatments during outpatient treatments 7.1
(iv) total specialist treatments (computed) 2.2
(v) total specialist treatments (observed) 2.4 
21 For a fee value of euro 360, the model mimics the situation before the financial reform. Note that this pre-reform
situation differs slightly from the calibration year, as we perform our simulations for the year 2000. 
22 The fee value of euro 360 is obtained by dividing in the calibration year aggregate expenditure on medical
specialist services by a volume index of medical specialist services. It thus averages the fees for a large number of
services that are delivered by medical specialists.
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6 Evaluation of policy experiments
6.1 A base simulation
To study the impact of the financial reform, we perform a base simulation and then conduct a
sensitivity analysis. In the latter, important parameters take values that are different from those
that apply in the base simulation. Section 6.2 discusses the sensitivity analysis; this section
discusses the base simulation.
The base simulation is fully determined by the empirical foundation discussed in the
previous section. It is important to note that until 1997 fees for publicly insured patients were
lower than the ones corresponding to privately insured patients. From 1997 onward, fees are
equal. As we are mainly interested in the impact of the financial reform, in all simulations we
have imposed the harmonisation already in the first year of the simulation, i.e. 1995; model
outcomes refer to the year 2000. 
We evaluate the values of interesting variables at 13 levels for the fee for services, which
we vary from zero to euro 1080 in steps of euro 90. This proves more than sufficient to sign the
effects of the financial reform, which reduces the fee-for-services from euro 360 to 0.
21 The
income of medical specialists, which is uniform for all fee levels, derives from calculating the
income that applies if both the fee equals euro 360 (which is close to the actual fee in 1995) and
lumpsum subsidies to medical specialists are zero.
22 Note that this rule implies that at a zero fee
the income of specialists is fully lumpsum financed. When the fee is equal to euro 360, her
income is completely funded by the fee-for-service system. At larger fee values, lumpsum
subsidies are negative and are reimbursed to patients (i.e. the consumer price is below the fee
for services).
The lumpsum income is the same for all specialists, no matter which option (financial or
ethical) they prefer. Consequently, if the response by ethical specialists and by financial
specialists to the introduction of a specialist budget is different, the income of ethical specialists
and financial specialists will change on account of the experiment. However, specialist income
averaged over the two groups of medical specialists is a constant.
As noted above, we perform calculations using fee values increasing from zero to euro
1080 in steps of euro 90. Figures 6.1 to 6.9 indicate the impact of variations in the fee for
specialist services on various variables that relate to specialist and patient behaviour.  
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We first analyse the supply curves of physicians that prefer the ethical or financial option. As
Figure 6.1 shows, the supply curve of the ethical specialist is (almost) flat. As ethical specialists
follow demand, there are no direct effects of changes in the fee for services, only indirect effects
which operate through the demand for specialist services. Hence, the curve for the supply by
ethical specialists reflects the demand curves of the publicly and privately insured (see Figures
6.4 and 6.5 below). The supply curve of financial specialists is more complex. It follows from
our discussion of the physician model in section 4 that the supply of specialist services equals
zero when the value of the fee t is low. When the fee is increased beyond the value of euro 270,
supply becomes positive and increasing. Hence, the substitution effects of fee changes dominate
the income effects. Due to the curvature of the utility function of the specialist, the increase of
labour supply slows down for high values of the fee.
Figure 6.1   Supply of total treatments
Supply under the ethical option and supply under the financial option are equal at a fee value of
about euro  630. Due to the equality of the former type of supply with demand, aggregate supply
and demand for subsequent treatments coincide also at the same fee value of euro 630. Due to
the assumption of proportional rationing, this also holds true for both types of insured (see
Figures 6.4 and 6.5). As at this fee value, the labour supply of specialists under both options is
the same, the utilities for the two options (exclusive ethical costs) also coincide. The
consequence of this is illustrated in Figure 6.2 which shows the share of physicians who prefer
the financial option. At  t = t
* = euro 630 (  defined as the value for   for which supply equals
( 
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demand), this share equals zero. The more the fee t deviates from  , the higher the yield of
(
optimisation and the larger the number of specialists who prefer the financial option.
Figure 6.1 demonstrates that the aggregate supply of subsequent treatments is
moderately increasing everywhere. That the slope of the aggregate supply curve is positive for
low values of the fee, follows from the decline of the share of financial specialists (see Figure
6.2). This decline increases the weight of ethical specialists who supply a higher level of services.
For higher fees, the aggregate supply curve becomes more steep, which reflects that the supply
curve of financial specialists is upward sloping.
Figure 6.2   Share of specialists that prefer the financial option 
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Figure 6.3   Consumer price
Figure 6.3 displays the relation between the consumer price and the producer fee for medical
services. It is negatively-sloped, due to the fact that the supply of services is increasing in the
producer fee. Indeed, in order to achieve that fee changes leave unaffected the income of
specialists, the consumer price must decline when the volume of specialist services increases.
Figure 6.4 demonstrates that the demand of publicly insured patients is independent of
the fee value. This is due to the absence of copayments in the public insurance scheme. 
23 This is an additional explanation for why fee increases decrease the number of specialists who prefer the financial option when
the fee is small (see Figure 6.2). 
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Figure 6.4   Demand and supply: publicly insured
Figure 6.5 shows that the demand of the privately insured increases marginally when the fee
increases. This does not mean that the slope of the aggregate demand curve Z is positive.
Rather, the fact that an increase in the fee for services causes the consumer price to decline
explains why demand is increasing in the fee for services.
Figure 6.6 shows the income of specialists. By construction, average income of financial
and ethical specialists is independent of the fee for services. However, the same does not hold
true for financial and ethical specialists taken separately. The reason is that the supply of
services by financial and ethical specialists is different. Because a fee increase boosts the supply
of services, it reduces lumpsum subsidies to specialists. As labour supply in the financial option
equals zero for small fees, it thus decreases the income of financial specialists. Similarly, income
of ethical specialists increases (as the average budget is constant).
23 For higher fees, the reverse
holds true. As soon as labour supply of the financial specialist becomes positive, her income
moves up. Now, income under the ethical option declines. 
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Figure 6.5   Demand and supply: privately insured
Figure 6.6   Income per specialist 
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Figures 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9 show the consumption-equivalent changes in specialist welfare, patient
welfare and social welfare respectively.
Figure 6.7   Consumption-equivalent change of medical specialist welfare
Figure 6.8   Consumption-equivalent change of patient welfare 
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Figure 6.9   Consumption- equivalent welfare changes
To assess the effects upon patient welfare, recall that consumption of non-medical services is
invariant to fee movements. Hence, changes in patient welfare fully reflect movements in health
care consumption. The consumption of health services changes only because of changes in
demand, movements in supply of the financial specialist and changes in the share of physicians
who prefer the financial option. It appears that patient welfare reaches its peak value at the fee
where the relative number of financial specialists is zero.
How can we explain that patient utility is highest when supply meets demand?
Obviously, we would expect differences between supply and demand to be welfare-reducing, as
the patient chooses his demand such as to maximise his utility. So in this case welfare losses
due to imperfect agency are zero.  However, other considerations suggest that welfare would be
higher if supply were below demand, thereby correcting the excess consumption due to moral
hazard. The reason why this does not occur lies in our financing rule for specialist income. The
welfare gain from a smaller loss due to moral hazard is a lower health insurance premium and
less copayments. However, our simulations keep the sum of premiums and copayments equal
to the budget value. The latter is kept constant by adjusting the lumpsum income to compensate
for fee changes. Hence, any welfare gain from the reduction of moral hazard is transmitted to
the group of medical specialists.
Figure 6.7 demonstrates how aggregate specialist utility depends on the fee value. The
utility function reaches a maximum at a fee value of euro 270. Combining the two welfare
functions, that of patients and that of specialists, into an aggregate social welfare function, leads
us to conclude that maximum social welfare is achieved for a fee of euro 540 (see Figure 6.9). In 
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the optimum, the fee for services is thus below the level for which supply equals demand.
Optimal supply policies reduce supply in order to compensate for the moral hazard effect in
demand.
As Figure 6.9 shows, the introduction of a budget for medical specialists, which
reduced the fee of euro 360 to nil, was welfare-reducing. Both patients and medical specialists
saw their welfare decline. Patient welfare decreased because the policy change aggravated an
inefficiency that already existed. In particular, patients suffered initially from a too low supply of
medical services; the fee reduction only widened the gap between supply and demand. Medical
specialists also suffered from the fee decrease. Although the financial reform has benefited
physicians as it has increased consumption of leisure time, it has also pushed up ethical costs.
The impact of the latter more than offsets the effect of the former.
6.2 Sensitivity analysis
As discussed, we have constructed our model such as to mimic as good as possible the Dutch
system of care provided by medical specialists. This implies among other things that the
parameter configuration upon which the above model calculations are based, fits closely the
Dutch health care sector. Yet, it is obvious that in reality some parameters may take different
values. To see whether deviations from our benchmark parameter configuration yield different
results, this section conducts a sensitivity analysis.
In particular, this section focuses on three variables that we view as crucial for our
numerical results: the price elasticity of supply, the price elasticity of demand and the income of
medical specialists. Therefore, this section considers three types of calculations. The first one
varies the price elasticity of labour supply by imposing 75% higher and lower values for the
elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption in the utility function of the specialist
. The second varies the price elasticity of demand by making similar changes in the value of ( F
in the utility functions of the publicly and privately insured. Finally, the third examines the
consequences of assuming that the budget of the specialist is based on an income linked to fee
values of euro 180 and euro 540, respectively. The relation between initial supply and demand
may also be relevant, as it determines the size of the supplier-induced demand distortion relative
to the moral hazard distortion. However, we did not include this variable in our sensitivity
analysis as it is an endogenous variable in our model.
We have deliberately specified the range of parameter values defined by these
calculations as very wide and even wider than we judge as realistic. The reason is that if our
conclusions pass this test, this strongly supports the conclusion from the base simulation. 
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(i) Changes in the elasticity of substitution F
In the base scenario the value of F is set at 6.91 (see table 5.1). Here we will analyse effects of
changing the value of F to 3.9 (low variant) and 12.1 (high variant).
In the high variant, the fee value that minimises the number of financial specialists falls
down from euro 630 to about euro 540. The same holds true for the fee that optimises the
welfare function for both types of insured patients: it drops from euro 540 to euro 450. In the
low variant (F = 3.9) it appears that the share of financial specialists does not reach its minimum
at fee values lower than euro 1080. We observe the same phenomenon when we inspect social
welfare. In this case, the model is always in a situation of excess demand. Of course, this is
linked to the strong preference of medical specialists for leisure time relative to consumption.
We conclude that our results are quite sensitive to changes in the price elasticity of
supply of medical specialists. However, our main conclusion that the introduction of local
initiatives was welfare-reducing remains valid in these two cases.
(ii) Changes in the value of (
Changes in   affect the marginal utility of non-medical consumption and the value of demand (
if total expenditure is below the copayment maximum (see equation (4)). The base line value is
11.52 10
-6 ; here, we take 75% lower and higher values.
In both variants, the absolute value of welfare changes. In particular, lower values of (
yield higher values for welfare and vice versa. The same holds true for demand and supply as
both demand and supply react to changes in  . Still, excess demand continues to be zero when (
the fee equals euro 630 (i.e. the same value as in the base scenario). The fee that optimises social
welfare equals euro 450 in the low variant and euro 540  in the high variant, almost identical to
its value in the benchmark case.
We therefore conclude that the results of the model are quite insensitive to changes in
the marginal utility of non-medical consumption. Therefore, the changes made to the value of (
do not affect our result that the financial reform was welfare-reducing.
(iii) Changes in the value of the specialist budget
The average budget per specialist in the base scenario amounts to euro 129,200, which
corresponds to the average income in absence of a budget when the fee equals euro 360. In the
low scenario the budget is reduced to euro 71,700 and in the high variant the budget is euro
219,500. These income values are linked to situations where the budget is zero and the fee
equals 180 and 540 euros, respectively. Figures 6.10 and 6.11 highlight some differences
between the three situations. 
In figure 6.10 we see that the minimum of the fraction of specialists that prefer the
financial option varies from fee values of (about) euro 640 (low variant) to euro 810 (high 
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variant). Note that there will always be a fee value that makes this fraction exact equal to zero;
but, as we evaluate the fee at discrete points, the graphs do not always indicate the exact minima.
Figure 6.10   Share of specialists that prefer the financial option at three different budget values
Figure 6.11   Consumption-equivalent change of social welfare at three budgets of specialists 
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It will be clear now that the optima of patient welfare in the two variants and the points of
intersection of demand and supply are linked to each other. Patient welfare is higher when the
budget is lower. This phenomenon is also linked to labour supply under the financial option; see
Figure 6.11. The lower the budget, the sooner labour supply gets positive. For high values of the
fee the supply curves converge: labour supply is bounded by the time constraint (14).
The optimal fee values differ only slightly more than in the two previous cases: euro 540
in case of a high budget and euro 360 in case of a low budget. Again, our main result that the
shift in financing arrangement for medical specialists was welfare-reducing continues to hold
true. 
Table 6.1 summarises our findings.
The welfare change from the old to new system corresponds to a fee change of t = euro  360 to
t= 0. In the budget variants, the initial fee values are euro  540 and euro  180, respectively.
Table 6.1 Results corresponding to 6 alternative parameter configurations
variant optimal fee (patients) optimal fee (specialists) optimal fee (total) welfare change from
old to new
standard 720 270 540 –1160
high F 540 270 450 –1220
low F 1080  360 1080 –1560
high (  720 270 540 –1360
low (  720 270 450 –1010
high budget 810 360 540 –1280
low budget 630 180 360 –1090 
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7 Conclusions
This paper draws two conclusions that differ in their scope. The importance of the finding that
the reduction of fees for specialist services in the Netherlands reduced social welfare is obvious.
This result follows from the position of the initial fee for services, euro 360, relative to the level
that optimises our social welfare measure, euro 540. As the policy change increases the
deviation of the actual fee from its optimal level, it aggravates the welfare loss from a suboptimal
financing scheme. Note however that our conclusion on the adverse welfare effect of the policy
change does not hinge upon the position of the optimal fee. As our sensitivity analysis and
Figure 6.9 clearly demonstrate, we would have found the same result when the optimal fee level
had been somewhat below euro 360. Indeed, the steep decline of the social welfare measure in
the range running from a zero fee to a fee of euro 360 indicates that our result on the welfare-
decreasing nature of the shift in financing scheme is robust to minor changes of parameters or
initial conditions.
A caveat is in order with respect to our definition of the policy change. We have defined
the financing scheme that resulted after the reform as being fully lumpsum, i.e. with a zero
services fee. Van den Berg and Mot (2000) report that in some hospitals, it is agreed that
specialist budgets might be increased if specialist production grows faster than expected. To the
extent that these agreements are credible, the financial reform may actually be perceived not as a
switch from a fee-for-service scheme to a lumpsum scheme, but as a plain reduction of the fee
for medical services. It can be seen from Figure 6.9 that, if this is true, our calculations overstate
the impact of the change in financing scheme. However, this would not affect our finding that
the introduction of a lumpsum budget for specialist services has reduced social welfare.
A second central result is that the optimal financing scheme features both a fee-for-
service element and a budget element. This result may be more universal than the previous one.
In particular, in order to be able to meet two targets, i.e. an efficient supply of medical services
and a given income for medical specialists, one should have at least two instruments. A
financing scheme that combines a fee-for-service element with a budget element provides two
such instruments. Restricting the financing scheme to one instrument only will generally result
in a suboptimal outcome.
Our analysis could be extended further. One option is to explore whether the financial
reform may have induced specialists to engage in risk-selection strategies. Indeed, fee
reductions may not only have induced medical specialists to reduce their supply of services, but
may also have led them to intensify their efforts to dump high-risk consumers, i.e.  supply no
services at all to these patients (Ellis and McGuire (1986), Newhouse (1996)). If this is the case,
the financial reform has had more adverse welfare effects than recognized in this paper. 
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Appendix A Critical values for the patient models
The expressions for   and   can be derived as follows. First we determine the expressions ,
( ,
((
for the indirect utility functions corresponding to the two interior solutions (4) and (5) and the
corner solution (3). To that end, we substitute the demand equations for medical services into
the budget constraints to obtain similar expressions for c; subsequently, the expressions for zi
and c are substituted into the utility functions. Denote these three indirect utility functions by
,   and  , where subscript 1 refers to demand equation (4), subscript 2 to , , ,
demand equation (5) and subscript 3 to the corner solution equation (3).   can now be ,
(
determined by setting   equal to  . Similarly,   can be derived by setting  , , ,
(( ,
equal to   and  follows by setting   equal to   . We end up with the , ,
((( , ,
following expressions:
where the auxiliary terms are defined as follows
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Appendix B Welfare
This Appendix explains how the expected values and variances of important variables can be
calculated, given that we assume the parameters   and   to be lognormally distributed. ,
Some properties of the lognormal distribution
A stochastic variable x is said to be lognormally distributed if its logarithm, ln x, is normally
distributed with parameters, say, µ en F. The density function g(.) of x obeys:
And it follows that:
where F(.) denotes the standard normal distribution function.
From (B2) it also follows that the mathematical expectation of x, E(x), obeys:
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Conditional variance:
Coefficient of variation (the ratio of standard deviation and expectation):
So the coefficient of variation of the lognormal distribution only depends on the variance of the
corresponding normal distribution
The conditional n-th moment now equals:
Average utility per patient
We may write average utility (see equation (1)) as follows:
This expression can be rewritten as:
with Fc and  Fx the standard deviations of non-medical consumption c and realised medical
consumption volume x.
The expected value of non-medical consumption
Non-medical consumption is a stochastic variable as copayments are stochastic. The latter are
linked to the distribution of need across patients. Formally, 
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where m and tc have been defined in the main text already and y 
g denotes gross income.
The variance of non-medical consumption equals that of copayments cp. We derive an
expression for the expectation of the square of cp, following equations (B2) and (B8). The
computation of the variance can then easily be computed from formula (B5). 
Expected value of medical consumption
We specify the demand for first treatments per patient, zf, as a fixed share in total demand per
patient z (see equation (10)):
where the subscripts (p, n) refer to publicly and privately insured patients, respectively.
By definition consumption x
f equals demand z
f. Consumption of subsequent treatments per
insured person x
s is a weighted sum of the demand for subsequent treatments z
s and
corresponding supply. Let Gs (e) denote the distribution function of ethical costs e and  e
* the
value of e at which the specialist is indifferent between the ethical and financial option. Now
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Supply of subsequent treatments per specialist under the financial option   follows from
equation (16). Aggregated supply is allocated to both types of insured using shares in expected
demand:
with Ns the number of specialists, and Np and Nn  the numbers of publicly and privately insured
patients. The allocation of total supply to both types of patients is not unique as the model only
generates total supply   ; formula (B15) therefore expresses a rule of thumb needed to obtain
supply per type of insured patient. 
The next step is to compute expected medical consumption E(x). Note that x is a linear
function of demand z, which in turn depends on the parameter ,i . As a result, expected
consumption consists of an aggregate of conditional first and second order moments of the
stochastic variable  ,i . We will derive the expression in two steps. 
The expected value of ,i z. If it holds that  , then it follows that: ,
(( ,
(
To compute E(,i x) we need expressions (B14). It follows that:
































































































As x is a linear function of  z its variance is a linear function of the variance of z. We
derive an expression for the latter.
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Equations (B19) - (B23) enable us to compute the variance of total demand z. Finally, from
equation (B14) it follows that the variance of  x equals:
As both types of insured have distinct values for the parameter 0 corresponding variances of
total medical consumption also differ.
Expected utility of specialists can directly be derived from equation (30) in section 4.4.










Appendix C Consumption-equivalent welfare changes
To calculate social welfare, we have to bring the utility changes of patients and specialists on an
equal footing. We use   and   to denote the utility changes of the populations of the ) )
publicly and privately insured respectively. For specialists, we have to define four categories: for
specialists can opt for either one out of two options before and after the policy change. The utility
change for specialists that choose for the ethical option before and after the policy change reads
as   where   is defined in equation (23) and the index 0 refers to the initial situation, i.e. & *
before the policy change. Similarly, specialists who remain on the financial option undergo a
utility change   with   also defined in equation (23). The expression for the utility change & *
of specialists who choose to switch to the financial option are a little bit more complicated as the
specialist bears ethical costs only after the policy change:  . Similarly, the & * & * #
(
utility change undergone by specialists who switch to the ethical option reads as
. Note that the latter two categories cannot exist simultaneously. Either & * & * #
(*
some specialists switch to the ethical option or some specialists switch to the financial option;
two-way traffic cannot occur due to the one-dimensionality of physician heterogeneity.
To be able to compare these policy changes, we convert them into consumption
equivalents, defined as the equivalents in terms of the non-medical consumption good. This
procedure bears resemblance to the concept of Pareto efficiency as we analyse whether the utility
change of the winners of the policy change is sufficiently large to compensate the losers.
Actually, we calculate a sort of equivalent variation, the only difference being that the transfer
from the winners to the losers is in the form of non-medical consumption goods rather than
income and takes place ex post rather than ex ante. Hence, we use the direct utility function to
calculate consumption equivalents rather than the indirect utility function used by the measure
of equivalent variations.
In calculating consumption equivalents, we linearize around the initial position. For
patients, we abstract from the heterogeneity with respect to health status and assume that all
patients have the average health status. Using equation (1), the consumption equivalents of the














































 and   thus refer to the patient with health status  . The consumption equivalents of the ,
utility changes of the four categories of medical specialists can be calculated using the utility
function (13). First, we define:
and
To calculate the consumption-equivalent welfare change for the whole population of specialists,
we have to aggregate over all possible values of the ethical cost variable. The change in social
welfare can then be calculated as the sum of the consumption-equivalent welfare changes for the
two groups of insured and the consumption-equivalent welfare change for the population of
medical specialists. We have to distinguish between the case where the population fraction that
opts for the financial option increases ( ), equation (C5):
( (*
and the case where this population fraction declines ( ), equation (C6):
( (*
Note that the consumption-equivalents depend on the (conditional) expectations of the ethical
cost variable e. 
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